

DA 24-0293

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2026 MT 202

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

TRAVIS WAYNE HATFIELD,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DC 23-274
Honorable Brett D. Linneweber, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Tammy A. Hinderman, Appellate Defender Division Administrator,
Anthony P. Reed, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee:

Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Brad Fjeldheim,
Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Scott D. Twito, Yellowstone County Attorney, Hojae Chung, Deputy
County Attorney, Billings, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: April 8, 2026
Decided: August 25, 2026

Filed:


Clerk

Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Travis Wayne Hatfield appeals from the written judgment ordered by the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, sentencing him to 30 years at Montana State Prison for Sexual Abuse of Children Age 16 or Younger, and an additional 10 years, to run concurrently, for Sexual Abuse of Children – Possession of Material. Hatfield asserts he is entitled to resentencing because the District Court incorrectly labeled him as a violent offender and sentenced him as such. Additionally, Hatfield argues the District Court erred in not striking factually erroneous statements from the written judgment, and by imposing fees, costs, and surcharges. We restate the issues on appeal as follows:

- 1. Whether the District Court erred in sentencing Hatfield by incorrectly classifying him as a violent offender.*
- 2. Whether the District Court erred in refusing to strike allegedly false statements from its written judgment.*
- 3. Whether the District Court erred in imposing fees, costs, and surcharges into its written judgment.*

We affirm the District Court’s judgment, but remand to strike factually erroneous statements, as well as financial obligations which fail to conform to the oral pronouncement of Hatfield’s sentence.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 On January 27, 2023, Hatfield—a 37-year-old paraplegic with no feeling from the waist down—began communicating through social media with an individual who he believed to be a 12-year-old girl. Hatfield continued to communicate with this individual over the course of the next month, requesting “shower selfies,” nude images, and

expressing an interest in watching the individual engage in sexual intercourse with an adult male. Hatfield sent the individual videos of himself engaging in sexual intercourse with an adult female, as well as images of his genitals. Hatfield also informed the individual that he had previously had sex with five other minor females.

¶3 On February 25, 2023, Hatfield arranged to meet and have sex with the individual who he still believed to be a 12-year-old girl. Hatfield sent messages to the individual discussing the sexual conduct he wished to engage in and paid for the individual to take an Uber to MetraPark in Billings, Montana, where he planned to meet her. When Hatfield arrived at MetraPark, he was arrested by law enforcement.

¶4 Following his arrest, Hatfield admitted to communicating with, and arranging to meet and have sex with, an individual who he believed to be a 12-year-old girl. Hatfield told law enforcement that while he recognized that it was illegal for him to meet a 12-year-old for sex, he disagreed with the legal age of consent. Hatfield also admitted to buying child sexual abuse material (CSAM) online that included pictures of victims as young as five years old. Images of child pornography were found on his phone, as were numerous images of bestiality related pornography. Hatfield was ultimately charged with two counts of sexual abuse of children 12 years or younger (Counts I and II) and one count of sexual abuse of children based on his possession of CSAM (Count III).

¶5 On May 16, 2023, Hatfield entered a plea agreement with the State under which the State agreed to dismiss Count I and amend Count II to sexual abuse of children age 16 years or younger, while Count III regarding CSAM would remain unchanged. Under the agreement, the State would recommend Hatfield be sentenced to Montana State Prison for

30 years as to Count II and 10 years as to Count III, which would run concurrently to Count II.

¶6 A Presentence Investigation (PSI) was filed with the District Court on July 3, 2023, accompanied by a Psychosexual Evaluation (PSE). The PSE designated Hatfield a tier II offender, noting that Hatfield admitted to intending to have sex with a 12-year-old girl, as charged by the State, and that he also admitted to prior sexual contact with two 14-year-old girls. The PSE explained that Hatfield presented with numerous paraphilias and high levels of sexual deviance, that he “is not appropriately supervised or treated in the community-based setting,” and that “[h]is treatment needs are best served at the Montana State Prison.” The PSI also included recommended conditions, including “statutory conditions” addressing certain fees, costs, and surcharges.

¶7 A sentencing hearing was held on July 10, 2023, during which the State argued for a sentence consistent with the terms of the plea agreement, while defense counsel recommended a sentence of only 20 years at Montana State Prison for Count II and 10 years for Count III.

¶8 At the hearing, the District Court provided a detailed review of the statutory sentencing policies and explained that Hatfield’s case included “some of the most violent swings in mitigators and aggravators.” The District Court recognized the unique circumstances surrounding Hatfield’s health, as well as his prior service with the Army National Guard, and his cooperation with law enforcement and his psychosexual evaluator. However, the court noted Hatfield’s aggravators to be “just as rough on the other end of the spectrum.” While Hatfield’s communications had been with an undercover officer, the

District Court emphasized that there were direct victims with respect to his possession of CSAM, noting that victims of CSAM are particularly vulnerable and “have the most extraordinary suicide rate and emotional baggage that they carry, justifiably, for the rest of their lives,” and that “many of them never recover.” The court explained Hatfield’s “diagnosis makes [him] extraordinarily dangerous to a very vast part of the population that is vulnerable.” The court cited Hatfield’s PSE scores, which indicated high needs and an above average risk for re-offending. Additionally, the court referenced Hatfield’s prior sexual contact with underage girls, specifically his admission to having sexual contact with two 14-year-old girls in the last 8 to 9 years. The court considered concerns raised by the State regarding Hatfield’s access to his three minor children, aged 12, 14, and 16, and while it acknowledged Hatfield’s remorse towards his family, it stressed that Hatfield had not expressed any remorse with respect to his victims or acknowledged the danger that he presents to the community.

¶9 The court emphasized that Hatfield’s “inability to actually reach out to a child because it was actually a sting doesn’t take away from the fact that [he was] seeking out a young child.” It further clarified to Hatfield, “[i]f it hadn’t been for the STATIC scores, your composite, as well as [] those diagnoses, I would have imposed your counsel’s recommendation.” However, the court explained that while it “usually sentence[s] anybody with child porn to a consecutive sentence,” “taking into account some of these mitigators,” it ultimately agreed with the State’s recommendation and sentenced Hatfield to 30 years for Count II and 10 years for Count III, with Count III running concurrent to Count II. Additionally, the District Court informed Hatfield that it would recommend the

conditions set forth in the PSI and PSE into its judgment, explaining that “the Court will *recommend* the presentence investigation recommendations” because it “can’t actually impose those requirements, aside from any fines or requirements to submit to DNA. Some of those mandatory ones. But the specific conditions of the PSI are recommended.”

¶10 On January 16, 2024, the District Court issued its written judgment. In addition to ordering the sentences orally pronounced for Count II and Count III, the written judgment states, “IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that for any period of community supervision (parole), the following conditions will apply,” under which it designates “standard recommendations,” listing out the various fees, costs, and surcharges recommended by the PSI. Similarly, under “special recommendations,” the judgment lists the various recommendations set forth in the PSE. The written judgment also details the reasons for imposing Hatfield’s sentence, specifically referencing the sentencing policy outlined by § 46-18-101(2), (3), MCA, and noting that its exceptions to any mandatory minimums were analyzed under § 46-18-222, MCA. In paragraph 4, the judgment states, “The nature of the crimes pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-104 are crimes of violence and incarceration is warranted.” The court then explains, based on the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented in the PSI and PSE, rehabilitation “must be in the context of lengthy incarceration.” Specifically, the court provides in paragraph 15:

The [c]ourt, for the above-stated reasons, finds: the interest of justice and the needs of public truly require the level of security provided by imprisonment; the needs of Defendant are better served in the state prison; imprisonment of the Defendant will not create an excessive hardship on the Defendant or the Defendant’s family; this type of sentence or commitment provides numerous programs to assist Defendant along with the authority to place offender in community-based programs upon eligibility. Specifically,

the [c]ourt considered the factors outlined in § 46-18-225(2), Montana Code Annotated, and made specific findings on the record that none of the criteria outlined by statute supported a community placement, instead the Defendant has left the [c]ourt with no other option than an imprisonment sentence to protect the community, as nothing else within the arsenal of the criminal justice system has curbed the Defendant's criminal behaviors. The interests of justice and the need to protect the community from the Defendant require that the Defendant be incarcerated. Defendant has shown a pattern of behavior that demonstrates he is a threat to public safety.

¶11 On May 17, 2024, Hatfield filed a Motion to Amend the Judgment requesting the District Court strike its reference to his offenses as “crimes of violence” in paragraph 4 and the sentence in paragraph 15 stating that “nothing else within the arsenal of the criminal justice system has curbed the Defendant's criminal behaviors,” as factually erroneous. The District Court denied Hatfield's motion. Hatfield appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶12 The Supreme Court reviews a district court's imposition of a sentence for legality only by examining whether it is within the statutory parameters. *State v. Herman*, 2008 MT 187, ¶ 11, 343 Mont. 494, 188 P.3d 978. This is a question of law which we review de novo to determine whether the district court's interpretation of the law is correct. *State v. Kroll*, 2004 MT 203, ¶ 12, 322 Mont. 294, 95 P.3d 717.

DISCUSSION

¶13 *1. Whether the District Court erred in sentencing Hatfield by incorrectly classifying him as a violent offender.*

¶14 Hatfield asserts the District Court incorrectly labeled his conviction a “crime of violence” and, as a result, erred by sentencing him as a violent offender. To support his argument, Hatfield cites paragraph 4 of the District Court's written judgment, in which the

court states, “The nature of the crimes pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-104 are crimes of violence and incarceration is warranted.”

¶15 A defendant is considered a “nonviolent offender” if they have pled guilty to, or been convicted of, a felony offense other than a “crime of violence.” Section 46-18-104(3), MCA. Whether a defendant is a nonviolent offender is relevant in sentencing because a sentencing court must consider alternatives to imprisonment for nonviolent offenders—but not for violent offenders. Section 46-18-225, MCA. What constitutes a “crime of violence” is defined by § 46-18-104(2), MCA, which specifically provides:

(2)(a) “Crime of violence” means:

(i) a crime in which an offender uses or possesses and threatens to use a deadly weapon during the commission or attempted commission of a crime;

(ii) a crime in which the offender causes serious bodily injury or death to a person other than the offender; or

(iii) an offense under:

(A) 45-5-215;

(B) 45-5-502 for which the maximum potential sentence is life imprisonment or imprisonment in a state prison for a term exceeding 1 year;

(C) 45-5-503, except as provided in subsection (2)(b) of this section;

(D) 45-5-507 if the victim is under 16 years of age and the offender is 3 or more years older than the victim or if the offender inflicts bodily injury upon anyone in the course of committing the offense;

(E) 45-5-508;

(F) 45-5-603;

(G) 45-5-702;

(H) 45-5-703;

(I) 45-5-704; or

(J) 45-5-705.

(b) In a prosecution under 45-5-503, if the sexual intercourse was without consent based solely on the victim's age, the victim willingly participated, and the offender is not more than 3 years older than the victim, the offense is not a crime of violence for purposes of this section.

¶16 Given that Hatfield's offenses did not involve use of a deadly weapon and sexual abuse of children is not listed under § 46-18-104(2)(a)(iii), MCA, we must consider whether Hatfield's offenses caused serious bodily injury or death to another. For purposes of § 46-18-104(2)(a)(ii), "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that:

- (i) creates a substantial risk of death;
- (ii) causes serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function or process of a bodily member or organ;
or
- (iii) at the time of injury, can reasonably be expected to result in serious permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function or process of a bodily member of organ.

Section 45-2-101(66)(a), MCA. Serious bodily injury also includes "serious mental illness or impairment." Section 45-5-101(66)(b), MCA.

¶17 While Hatfield asserts the District Court made no mention of his crimes being "crimes of violence" during the sentencing hearing, the District Court did emphasize its general assessment of there being a substantial risk of death and serious mental illness in

relation to CSAM and child sex abuse crimes. The court had also emphasized that while Hatfield's charges were brought about from a sting operation, he was still attempting to have sexual intercourse with a young child and had previously done so.

¶18 For a crime to be a "crime of violence" under § 46-18-104(2)(a)(ii), MCA, there must be a showing that the crime caused serious bodily injury or death to a person other than the offender. Section 46-18-104(2)(a)(ii), MCA. Despite the general assessment that CSAM and child sex abuse crimes may risk physical or mental injury, such is insufficient to establish serious bodily injury. In this case, no evidence was presented before the court establishing that Hatfield's actions caused serious bodily injury. Without such evidence, Hatfield's crimes were not "crimes of violence" as defined by § 46-18-104, MCA. Thus, Hatfield was a "nonviolent offender" for sentencing purposes and the District Court's statement in paragraph 4 is an incorrect conclusion of law.

¶19 While Hatfield asserts the District Court's error entitles him to resentencing because his sentence is based on materially false information, we disagree. Hatfield is correct in that "[a] convicted criminal defendant has a due process right to be sentenced based on correct information." *See State v. Harper*, 2006 MT 259, ¶ 18, 334 Mont. 138, 144 P.3d 826 (citation omitted). However, "[a] defendant is under an affirmative duty to show the alleged misinformation is materially inaccurate or prejudicial before a sentence will be overturned." *State v. Bar-Jonah*, 2004 MT 344, ¶ 120, 324 Mont. 278, 102 P.3d 1229 (citation omitted). Further, it must be shown that the District Court relied on the materially inaccurate or unreasonably biased information in its sentencing. *Bar-Jonah*, ¶ 120.

¶20 Here, while the District Court erroneously labeled Hatfield a violent offender under § 46-18-104, MCA, Hatfield has not shown that the court relied on this incorrect information when it imposed his sentence. Rather, the record establishes the District Court understood the offenses underlying Hatfield’s conviction, considered the applicable sentencing factors specific to nonviolent offenders, evaluated alternatives to incarceration, and independently concluded that incarceration was necessary to protect the public. Indeed, the District Court’s sentencing order walks through the factors considered under § 46-18-225, MCA, a statute applicable only to *nonviolent* offenders. *See* § 46-18-225, MCA.

¶21 Section 46-18-225(1), MCA, specifically provides that “[i]n sentencing a *nonviolent* offender, the sentencing judge shall first consider alternatives to imprisonment,” while subsection (2) provides that in sentencing a *nonviolent* offender, the District Court shall consider whether:

- (a) The interests of justice and needs of public safety truly require the level of security provided by imprisonment of the offender in a state prison;
- (b) The needs of the offender can be better served in the community or in a facility or program other than a state prison;
- (c) There are substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the offense, though failing to establish a defense;
- (d) The offender acted under strong provocation;
- (e) The offender has made restitution or will make restitution to the victim of the offender’s criminal conduct;
- (f) The offender has no prior history of conviction for a criminal act or, if the offender has a prior history of conviction for a criminal act, the offender

- has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the present crime;
- (g) The offender’s criminal conduct was the result of circumstances that are unlikely to recur;
 - (h) The character and attitude of the offender indicate that the offender is likely to commit another crime;
 - (i) The offender is likely to respond quickly to correctional or rehabilitative treatment; and
 - (j) Imprisonment of the offender would create an excessive hardship on the offender or the offender’s family.

Section 46-18-225(2), MCA (emphasis added).

¶22 Here, pursuant to § 46-18-225(2), MCA, the District Court expressly found “the interest of justice and needs of public truly require the level of security provided by imprisonment” given Hatfield’s pattern of behavior—citing his two previous sexual contacts with 14-year-old girls within the last 8 to 9 years, as well as his current offenses—and noting the danger his behavior presents to vulnerable populations of the community. The court determined Hatfield’s needs were “better served in the state prison,” referencing his diagnoses and PSE scores, which categorized him as “High Needs” and placed him at an above average risk of sexual recidivism. The District Court voiced concerns as to Hatfield’s failure to express remorse with respect to his victims, and his failure to recognize the danger he presents to the community given his diagnoses. Thus, having considered alternatives to incarceration and the factors outlined by § 46-18-225(2), MCA, and after making specific findings that no criteria supported community placement, the District

Court concluded the interests of justice and need to protect the community require Hatfield's incarceration.

¶23 Though the District Court considered § 46-18-225, MCA, and found incarceration necessary, Hatfield asserts resentencing is necessary because “it remains unknown to what extent the court relied on its finding that [Hatfield] was a violent offender.” However, contrary to Hatfield's assertion, it is clear from the record that the court's error played little to no role in Hatfield's sentencing. Hatfield's status as a violent or nonviolent offender is relevant to the determination as to whether alternatives to imprisonment must be considered pursuant to § 46-18-225, MCA. Yet, despite labeling Hatfield's offenses “crimes of violence,” the District Court nonetheless treated Hatfield as a nonviolent offender by correctly applying § 46-18-225, MCA. Thus, the District Court did not rely on materially false information in sentencing Hatfield and the legal error did not materially affect the sentence. Accordingly, the District Court's reference to Hatfield's offenses as crimes of violence—though incorrect—did not render the sentence illegal and Hatfield is not entitled to resentencing.

¶24 2. *Whether the District Court erred in refusing to strike allegedly false statements from its written judgment.*

¶25 Hatfield asserts the District Court erred in denying his motion to amend the judgment, in which he specifically requested the court strike paragraph 4 and language in paragraph 15 stating “nothing else within the arsenal of the criminal justice system has curbed the Defendant's criminal behaviors,” due to the statements being factually erroneous.

¶26 Section 46-18-116(3), MCA, states that a “court may correct a factually erroneous sentence or judgment at any time.” However, “[s]uch an amendment may only be made to correct an error that is apparent on the face of the record so as to insure the correction does not in effect set aside a judgment actually rendered nor change what was originally intended.” *State v. Megard*, 2006 MT 84, ¶ 19, 332 Mont. 27, 134 P.3d 90 (citation omitted).

¶27 Here, as discussed, the District Court’s statement in paragraph 4 incorrectly labels Hatfield’s offenses as “crimes of violence.” Further, the District Court’s statement in paragraph 15 that “nothing else within the arsenal of the criminal justice system has curbed the Defendant’s criminal behaviors,” is factually erroneous. While the District Court’s statement is likely in reference to Hatfield’s repeated and undeterred pursuit of sexual contact with underage girls despite knowing it is illegal, it was factually inaccurate for the court to state “nothing else within the arsenal of the criminal justice system has curbed [Hatfield’s] criminal behaviors” when Hatfield had no criminal history, and thus the only mechanism employed was general deterrence.

¶28 The District Court’s errors in making the statements in paragraphs 4 and 15 are apparent on the face of the record given the absence of any evidence demonstrating bodily injury and Hatfield’s utter lack of any criminal history. Further, removing paragraph 4 and the specified language in paragraph 15 from the written judgment will not effectively set aside judgment or alter what the District Court originally intended. As discussed, it is clear from the District Court’s analysis under § 46-18-225, MCA, that the imposed sentence is warranted. Accordingly, we remand to the District Court with instructions to strike

paragraphs 4 as legally incorrect and the quoted language from paragraph 15 as factually erroneous pursuant to § 46-18-116(3), MCA.

¶29 3. *Whether the District Court erred in imposing fees, costs, and surcharges into its written judgment.*

¶30 Hatfield asserts the District Court erred in imposing fees, costs, and surcharges and that such financial obligations should be stricken from the written judgment. Specifically, Hatfield argues the imposition of such financial obligations in the written judgment are unreasonable given that the District Court had already found him indigent. Hatfield also argues the financial obligations should be stricken because they were not imposed at the sentencing hearing. The State, however, counters by asserting that the District Court did not impose any financial obligations. Rather, the fees, costs, and surcharges referenced in the written judgment were included only as recommendations to the parole board, consistent with the court's oral pronouncement at the sentencing hearing, and thus, there is no need to waive any obligation or amend the judgment. The State concedes, however, that "[i]f the DOC is applying the fees and costs in the parole recommendations as part of Hatfield's sentence . . . it would be inconsistent with the sentence imposed by the [D]istrict [C]ourt."

¶31 "It is well-established that the oral sentence pronounced from the bench in [the] defendant's presence is the 'legally effective sentence and valid, final judgment.'" *State v. Andress*, 2013 MT 12, ¶ 33, 368 Mont. 248, 299 P.3d 316 (quoting *State v. Lane*, 1998 MT 76, ¶ 40, 288 Mont. 286, 957 P.2d 9). To determine whether a written judgment is unlawful due to nonconformance with the oral pronouncement of a sentence, we must

determine “(1) whether the defendant was afforded the opportunity to respond to its inclusion upon sufficient notice at sentencing, and (2) whether that portion of the written judgment substantively increases the defendant’s loss of liberty or the defendant’s sacrifice of property.” *Kroll*, ¶ 20.

¶32 Here, the fees, costs, and surcharges Hatfield takes issue with are included as recommendations to the parole board, as the written judgment introduces them by stating, “IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that for any period of community supervision (parole), the following conditions will apply” before listing the fees, costs, and surcharges under a heading entitled “STANDARD RECOMMENDATIONS.” Thus, the District Court did not directly impose any financial obligations but rather recommended them to the parole board.

¶33 However, contrary to the State’s argument, the inclusion of fees, costs, and surcharges as “recommendations” to the parole board does not conform with the oral pronouncement of Hatfield’s sentence. At sentencing, the District Court stated, “the Court will recommend the presentence investigation recommendations” because “[the court] can’t actually impose those as requirements.” The District Court, however, had the authority to impose all the fees, costs, and surcharges recommended by the PSI, some of which

are even mandatory. *See* § 46-18-232(1), MCA (“A court may require a convicted defendant . . . to pay costs, as defined in 25-10-201, plus costs of jury service, costs of prosecution, and the cost of pretrial, probation, or community service supervision as a part of the defendant’s sentence.”); § 46-18-111(3), MCA (requiring a defendant to pay \$50 to

the Department of Corrections (DOC) at the time their PSI is conducted “unless the court determines that the defendant is not able to pay the fee within a reasonable time”); § 3-1-317(1) (requiring a convicted defendant to pay a \$10 surcharge for information technology upon conviction unless the court waives the payment). Thus, it was not clear from the District Court’s oral pronouncement that fees, costs, and surcharges would be recommended to the parole board as part of Hatfield’s sentence given that the District Court could impose such financial obligations itself.

¶34 Accordingly, the District Court’s written judgment recommending fees, costs, and surcharges to the parole board does not comply with the oral pronouncement of Hatfield’s sentence. Hatfield was not afforded the opportunity to respond to the inclusion of these financial obligations and—if imposed by the parole board as recommended—the financial obligations would substantively increase Hatfield’s loss of liberty and property. Further, a district court may not delegate its authority to determine whether a defendant must pay a financial obligation to the executive branch. *See U.S. v. Miller*, 77 F.3d 71, 77 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he statutory duty imposed upon district courts . . . ‘to fix the terms of a [fine] must be read as exclusive because the imposition of a sentence, including the terms of probation or supervised release, is a core judicial function.’”); *see also State v. Trombley*, 2026 MT 77, ¶ 11, 427 Mont. 384, 587 P.3d 779 (holding that a district court lacked statutory authority to delegate to the parole board the ability to reinstate all suspended fees and fines upon a finding that the defendant failed to comply with the terms of probation). Thus, because the written judgment’s inclusion of fees, costs, and surcharges as recommendations to the parole board does not conform with the oral pronouncement of

Hatfield's sentence, and because the District Court lacks the authority to delegate this function to the DOC, we remand to strike the recommended financial obligations from the written judgment.

CONCLUSION

¶35 The District Court's judgment entered January 16, 2024, is affirmed, though pursuant to § 46-18-116, MCA, we remand to the District Court with instructions to strike paragraph 4 and the quoted language at issue in paragraph 15 due to the statements being factually erroneous, and to strike the recommended financial obligations as nonconforming with the oral pronouncement of sentence.

/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

We Concur:

/S/ CORY J. SWANSON

/S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY

/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA

/S/ JIM RICE