FILED 01/11/2024

Bowen Greenwood
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MONTANA

Case Number: DA 24-0033

Ian P. Gillespie **DRIGGS, BILLS & DAY, P.C.**

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Attorney for Appellant

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA SUPREME COURT CAUSE NO. In the Matter of the Estate of JESSE L. BECK, Deceased. JASON BECK, Appellant, NOTICE OF APPEAL v. ALEXIA BECK, Personal Representative, Appellee.

NOTICE is given that Jason Beck, the Appellant above-named and who is the Petitioner for Formal Probate Proceedings in that cause of action filed in the Twenty-Second Judicial District, in and for the County of Carbon as Cause No. DP-2022-27, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Montana from the Order

Notice of Appeal

Sustaining Objection to Petition for Formal Probate and Denying Petition entered in such action on the 10th day of January, 2024, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as **Exhibit A**.

THE APPELLANT FURTHER CERTIFIES:

1. That this appeal is not subject to the mediation process required by M. R. App. P. 7.

2. That this appeal is not an appeal from an order certified as final under M. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

3. That notice under Mont. R. App. P. 27 is not required.

4. That all available transcripts of the proceedings in this cause have not been ordered from the court reporter contemporaneously with the filing of this notice of appeal because there are no transcripts of the proceedings in this cause. If all available transcripts have not been ordered, Appellant has complied with the provisions of M. R. App. P. 8(3) contemporaneously with the filing of this notice of appeal.

5. That included herewith is the filing fee prescribed by statute.

DATED this 11th day of January, 2024.

DRIGGS BILLS & DAY, P.C.Attorney for Appellant Jason Beck

By: /s/ Ian P. Gillespie
Ian P. Gillespie

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have filed a true and accurate copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL with the Clerk of the Montana Supreme Court and that I have served true and accurate copies of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL upon the Clerk of the District Court, each attorney of record, each court reporter from whom a transcript will be ordered, and each party not represented by an attorney in the above-referenced District Court action, as follows:

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Dated this 11th day of January, 2024.

/s/ Ian P. Gillespie
Ian P. Gillespie

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EXHIBIT A

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MONTANA TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, CARBON COUNTY

Cause No. DP 2022-27

Judge: Matthew J. Wald

ORDER SUSTAINING OBJECTION TO PETITION FOR FORMAL PROBATE AND DENYING PETITION

Before the Court is a Petition for Formal Probate Proceedings filed by Jason Beck ("Jason"), brother of the Decedent Jesse L. Beck ("the Decedent"), as well as an Objection to Jason Beck's Petition for Formal Probate Proceedings filed by Alexia Beck ("Alexia"), daughter of the Decedent. Jason is represented by Ian P. Gillespie. Alexia is represented by Eric W. Hinckley. Having reviewed the parties' filings, as well as the applicable law, the Court finds that Alexia's Objection has merit and must be sustained. As a result, Jason's Petition must be denied.

Deceased.

Jason's Petition asks that the Court admit to probate a video wherein the Decedent states his intention to give all his assets to Jason as Decedent's sole heir. The sole question raised by the Petition, and by Alexia's Objection, is whether such a video recording qualifies as an intended will under § 72-2-523, MCA (titled "Writings intended as wills"). Jason admits that the video "does not meet the requirements for a will under MCA § 72-2-522", which concerns traditionally executed wills and holographic wills. However, Jason asserts that the video is a "document" that was "intended as a will" and thus satisfies § 72-2-523. Alexia disagrees, asserting that a "document" under § 72-2-523 clearly must be something in writing, and the term is not so broad

as to include any thing that may possibly be stored digitally, such as a video. After a review of the statute at issue, the Court must agree with Alexia that a video does not qualify as a document under § 72-2-523.

Section 72-2-523 provides that "[a]lthough a document or writing added upon a document was not executed in compliance with [§] 72-2-522, the document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in compliance with that section if the proponent of the document or writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or writing to constitute:

- (1) the decedent's will;
- (2) a partial or complete revocation of the will;
- (3) an addition to or an alteration of the will; or
- (4) a partial or complete revival of the decedent's formerly revoked will or of a formerly revoked portion of the will."

The plain language of § 72-2-523 clearly and unambiguously limits its application to writings and documents and does not encompass other manners through which a decedent may have expressed his or her testamentary intent. The title is "Writings intended as wills". (Emphasis added). The statute allows for probate, under certain circumstances, of "a document or writing added upon a document" even if it "was not executed in compliance with 72-2-522." (Emphasis added). In construing a statute, the role of the judge is "simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted." Section 1-2-101, MCA. The analysis of whether Jason's proffered video requires no more than this review of the statutory language and thus can stop here: the statute by its own unambiguous terms does not allow a video to be considered as a document or writing upon a document that was intended as a will.

Nevertheless, Jason urges the Court to essentially expand the meaning of "document" to allow a video to meet the criteria of the statutory language. As written above, it would be improper for the Court to engage in such creative analysis when the statute is clear and unambiguous. For the sake of completeness, however, the Court will briefly address Jason's argument. Jason cites several dictionary definitions of "document" that, he argues, encompass essentially anything stored digitally. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary, document (11th Ed. 2019) ("Any electronic media content, other than a computer program or system file, intended to be used in an electronic or printed form."). Section 72-2-523 was adopted in 1994, well before the sources that Jason cites were published, but even that definition is not so broad as to encompass a video as opposed to a writing that is stored on a device. However, the Court need not even look that far back, as the 8th Edition of Black's Law Dictionary, published in 2004, defines document as "[s]omething tangible on which words, symbols or marks are recorded" or "[t]he deeds, agreements, title papers, letters, receipts, and other written instruments used to prove a fact." Black's Law Dictionary, document (9th Ed. 2004). Clearly, any conception of "document" as including all digital files whatsoever is a recent addition that overs no insight as to what the Legislature intended when it adopted § -523, and likely would not encompass a video in any event. Further, even if the Court accepted Jason's definition of "document" in a general sense, it makes no sense within the context of § -523. The statute allows for probate of a "document or writing upon a document", implying that documents can be written on. It strains credulity to imagine that a video can have writing "upon it." The Court cannot stretch the Montana probate statutes as argued by Jason, and thus rejects Jason's broad definition of document, at least as applied here.

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This interpretation of § -523 concords with case law in Montana, other states, and academic examinations of this issue. The parties do not dispute that Montana has never allowed the probate of a video as an intended will. Jason has provided exactly zero cases from any jurisdiction whatsoever doing so. However, the Montana Supreme Court appears to consider "document" as synonymous with "writing". See In re Estate of Brooks, 279 Mont. 516, 522 (1996) (noting that, under § -523, "the proponent of a document bears the burden of proving the decedent's intent that the writing constitutes his or her will")(emphasis added). In addition, Alexia has offered limited caselaw from other jurisdictions that rejected the use of a recording as a testamentary instrument. See, e.g. In re Estate of Reed, 672 P.2d 829, 833 (Wyo. 1983)(rejecting the use of an audio recording as a testamentary instrument absent the legislature explicitly choosing to allow it). Further, law review articles and other academic works have overwhelmingly found that videos and other such recordings do not qualify. See, e.g. Natalie Banta, ARTICLE: Electronic Wills and Digital Assets: Reassessing Formality in the Digital Age, 71 Baylor L. Rev. 547, 583 (2019)("Although statutory approval may not even be needed for documents that exist entirely in digital form saved on a computer, statutory approval would be needed for an electronic will in the form of a video or audio recording. Even applying the lenient harmless error doctrine, it is unlikely that a video or audio recording could overcome the plain statutory requirement of a writing.")(emphasis added).

While Jason attempts to distinguish Alexia's sources, he fails to provide any similar authority supporting his argument, beyond the dictionary references referred to above. The Court considers cases involving electronic versions of writings, such as "electronic note[s]", to be clearly distinguishable, as these electronic writings are (1) writings, (2) fit even the older definition of "document", and (3) become indistinguishable from any other writing once printed

out. See *In re Estate of Horton*, 325 Mich. App. 325, 334-335, 925 N.W.2d 207 (2018)("find[ing] no error in the probate court's determination that decedent intended for the electronic document in question to constitute his will", where this was "a document he had *written* electronically".)(Emphasis added). In short, nothing Jason has presented to the Court supports the argument that a video qualifies as a "document" as envisioned by the Legislature when it adopted § -523, or that the Court can consider the proffered video as a testamentary document.

As such, the Court finds that a video recording of a decedent, even if it records him or her expressing testamentary intent, does not qualify as a "document or writing upon a document" as used in § -523. If Mr. Beck had wished to guarantee that his testamentary intent as expressed at the moment in time when he was videoed was honored, he needed to have done so by meeting the criteria of current Montana law. Alexia's *Objection* has merit and is sustained, and Jason's *Petition* must be denied. As the Court has decided this issue on the plain statutory language, it will not address other arguments raised, such as the general purpose of the statute.

For these reasons,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Alexia's Objection to Jason Beck's Petition for Formal Probate Proceedings is SUSTAINED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jason's Petition for Formal Probate Proceedings is

DENIED and DISMISSED.

DATED this 10th day of January, 2024.

MATTHEW J. WALD, District Judge

ce: Eric W. Hinckley Ian P. Gillespie

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Ian Philip Gillespie, hereby certify that I have served true and accurate copies of the foregoing Notice - Notice of Appeal to the following on 01-11-2024:

Eric Wayne Hinckley (Attorney) 6028 South Ridgeline Drive Suite 200 Ogden UT 84405 Representing: Alexia Beck Service Method: eService

Rochelle Loyning (Clerk of District Court) 102 N. Broadway PO Box 948 Red Lodge MT 59068 Service Method: eService

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Electronically Signed By: Ian Philip Gillespie

Dated: 01-11-2024