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Case Number: AC 17-0694

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IN THE ASBESTOS CLAIMS COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

IN RE ASBESTOS LITIGATION,

Consolidated Cases

Cause No. AC 17-0694

PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO BNSF'S OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' MASTER DISCOVERY REQUESTS TO BNSF

INTRODUCTION

BNSF's Objection to Plaintiffs' Master Discovery Requests inappropriately takes the form of a motion to strike the entirety of Plaintiffs' requests. BNSF alleges Plaintiffs' requests are "unnecessarily cumulative, not reasonably limited in time or scope, and seek discovery of information that is privileged." BNSF has made no specific objections to individual requests, instead asserting broad concerns with the discovery and only referencing specific requests as "examples." All of this makes Plaintiffs' response, as intended by the Court, difficult. Nonetheless, for ease of the Court's review, the subject of Plaintiffs' response mirrors BNSF's objections.

A. Plaintiffs' requests are not unnecessarily cumulative and have been reasonably limited in time and scope.

As an initial matter, there is apparently some confusion between the parties regarding the intended scope of the Master Discovery Requests to Defendants. Plaintiffs' counsel was under the impression that the initial master discovery was intended to result in the production of initial information and documentation generally applicable to the duty, liability, and causation issues common to Plaintiffs' claims <u>across the board</u> rather than being specifically tailored to each Plaintiff's claim. Plaintiffs' counsel was under the impression that the Master Set of Discovery to Defendants would allow for a single response by BNSF to apply to a large number of cases and would be preferable to the parties having to revisit these issues in multiple cases in the future. This interpretation would warrant a more in-depth response by BNSF as it would only need to be accomplished once.

Plaintiffs' impression of the intent of the Master Discovery was based on the language of this Court's Order directing that the Master Discovery Requests were to provide for the "seamless and expeditious exchange of <u>initial information</u>" and this Court's instruction during the February 20th hearing that the Master Discovery was meant to "cut across cases for the Defendants and get basic and complete information from the Plaintiffs regarding the allegations and the claims" and that "case-specific

discovery will be allowed upon request as the cases progress." (Transcript of February 20 Hearing, 73:6-14.) Moreover, Plaintiffs were under the impression that the Plaintiff Fact Sheets were designed to convey the information necessary for case assessment and management in the vast majority of cases that are not selected as Lead/Test cases.

This difference in understanding between the parties appears to be the primary basis for BNSF's objection that Plaintiffs' requests are "unnecessarily cumulative and not reasonably limited in time or scope." For example, as pointed out by BNSF, certain requests span periods from 1950 to the present. These requests were drafted in an effort to capture the great majority of information relevant to the claims of Plaintiffs with various exposure periods throughout this span of time. Similarly, BNSF takes issue with Interrogatory No. 10, which asks BNSF to "identify all persons that have knowledge that is generally relevant in all Plaintiffs' cases, including with respect to any of the allegations contained in the Plaintiffs' most current complaints, or knowledge pertaining to any of the defenses set forth in BNSF's Answers." This request was aimed at the identification of individuals possessing knowledge generally applicable to all cases, rather than every person with knowledge about any of the cases, which drastically reduces the implied scope of the request.

BNSF also objects to the scope of Interrogatory No. 4, seeking the identification of all claims, lawsuits or requests for compensation based upon

exposure to asbestos in Lincoln County between 1950 and the present. Given Plaintiffs' stated understanding of the purpose of the "master discovery" propounded to BNSF, Plaintiffs believe this request seeks relevant information that is reasonably limited in both time and place. In addition, Plaintiffs have explicitly excluded from the request any claims made by individuals represented by Libby Plaintiffs' counsel. That said, if the number of such asbestos claims in Lincoln County is still so large as to make identification unduly burdensome, Plaintiffs are agreeable to discussing limiting the response or looking into other options for obtaining this information.

B. The possibility that some hypothetical responsive documents are potentially privileged is insufficient to warrant striking Plaintiffs' discovery requests.

BNSF argues that Plaintiffs' requests impermissibly "<u>seek</u> the discovery of privileged information" and "should not be allowed by the Court." Plaintiffs do not specifically seek the discovery of properly privileged information. The mere probability that a request for information or documents could be interpreted as extending to certain hypothetical privileged materials is not an appropriate basis to strike the entire response. To the contrary, the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure dictate an appropriate and required procedure:

Rule 26. General Provisions Governing Discovery

(6) Claiming Privilege or Protecting Trial-Preparation Materials.

(A) Information Withheld. When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable by claiming that the information is privileged or subject to protection as trial-preparation material, the party must:

(i) expressly make the claim; and

(ii) describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced or disclosed--and do so in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the claim.

M. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(6). The Manual on Complex Litigation also specifically adopts

this solution and recommends the use of a privilege log as already incorporated in

the Directions section of Plaintiffs' Requests to BNSF:

A claim for protection against disclosure based on privilege or protection of trial preparation materials <u>must be made "expressly" and</u> <u>describe the nature of the allegedly protected information sufficiently</u> <u>to enable the opposing parties to assess the merits of the claim</u>. This is usually accomplished by counsel submitting a log (frequently called a "*Vaughn Index*") identifying documents or other communications by date and by the names of the author(s) and recipient(s), and describing their general subject matter (without revealing the privileged or protected material.) Unresolved claims of privilege should be presented directly to the judge for a ruling; if necessary, the judge can review the disputed information *in camera*.

Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth, § 11.43, Privilege Claims and Protective Orders, p. 62-3 (italics in original).¹ Such privilege logs are an accepted and required method in all Montana courts for dealing with issues of privilege in discovery. *See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mont.*, 408

¹ Unless otherwise noted, all emphasis herein has been added.

F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir. 2005) (determining privilege had been waived and ordering BNSF to produce documents it asserted were privileged because it failed to timely disclose them in a privilege log). Moreover, Defendants' Master Discovery to Plaintiffs (**P** 9) asks that Plaintiffs provide Defendants with privilege log information, conceding its appropriateness.

BNSF's objection regrading privileged materials also greatly over-states the allowable scope of attorney client and attorney work product privilege. BNSF mischaracterizes, as "brazen" impositions on privilege, Plaintiffs' requests seeking a) identification of the laws, rules and regulations that BNSF relied upon in developing asbestos safety policies in Lincoln County (Int. No. 3); b) whether BNSF contends anyone or anything other than BNSF was responsible for Plaintiffs' injuries including the identity and factual and legal basis for that contention (Int. No. 11); c) identification of written, recorded, or otherwise transcribed statements regarding or referring to Libby Vermiculite in Lincoln County (Int. No. 26); d) BNSF communications regarding Libby Vermiculite (RFP No. 7); and e) documents regarding Libby Vermiculite remediation efforts in Lincoln County (RFP No. 11). Lastly in this section, BNSF inaccurately represents that Interrogatories No. 14 and 26 specifically seek "statements that have been obtained by BNSF in anticipation of litigation." Rather, these requests simply seek the identification of documents and statements regarding the presence of Libby Vermiculite or Associated Asbestos on BNSF properties and in Lincoln County, making no reference to any litigation.

Each of these requests are narrowly focused on obtaining the relevant information and documents underlying the cases here and are far from "brazen" attempts to obtain properly privileged information. It is illogical to assume that a party can request necessary responsive materials without implicating some potentially privileged materials. If any of the above requests do implicate potentially privileged materials, the proper course is to withhold the material and list it in a privilege log rather than striking the entirety of Plaintiffs' requests as BNSF suggests.

C. Production of a privilege log to Plaintiffs is appropriate and required under applicable authority.

BNSF next objects to producing a privilege log to Plaintiffs, arguing instead that is should be provided only to the Court for in-camera review. In support of its position BNSF cites to a Montana District Court order for the proposition that "a privilege log can have the effect of disclosing privileged information and litigation strategy," asking the Court to ignore the <u>countless</u> Montana cases in which a privilege log was provided to opposing counsel. <u>Defendants' own Master</u> <u>Discovery to Plaintiffs requests that Plaintiffs provide the information typically included in a privilege log to them in Plaintiffs' responses</u>. (Master Discovery Requests to Plaintiff, **P** 9.) BNSF's proposition is not the accepted practice and "defeats the log's purpose of giving the adverse party notice of the details of why the privileges were applicable." *See e.g.* 1 Attorney-Client Privilege: State Law

Montana § 11:8 (treatise specifically discussing and criticizing the district court order cited by BNSF.)

In fact, the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure specifically direct that the withheld document must be described "in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the claim," placing the burden of sufficiently describing the document without disclosing privileged information on the party claiming privilege (BNSF) and requiring that it be provided to the other parties (Plaintiffs) to assess the claim of privilege. M. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(6). If the parties cannot resolve a dispute over privilege, the Court may then become involved to assess through in-camera review the document at issue: "Unresolved claims of privilege should be presented directly to the judge for a ruling; if necessary, the judge can review the disputed information in camera." Manual for Complex Litigation, Fourth, § 11.43, Privilege Claims and Protective Orders, p. 62-3 (italics in original). This procedure is fair and equally applicable to all parties.

BNSF also objects to the information Plaintiff suggests should be included in the privilege log in the definitions section of the discovery requests to BNSF, claiming it "detailed **ten** separate categories of information." This objection is similarly without merit. An examination of the requested information reveals that it is typical and reasonable information to include in a privilege log. The requested information is limited to author, recipients, date, number of pages, a brief description of the document, the privilege claimed, the requests it is responsive to, and how/where the document is stored. This information is largely mirrored by the information requested by Defendants in their Master Discovery to Plaintiff:

9. If you assert any privilege as to any information responsive to this Discovery, describe the subject matter and date of the information, the type of document (if any) containing the information, all person(s) giving and all person(s) receiving the information, and the ground(s) upon which you allege that the information is privileged or otherwise protected from discovery. If you assert a privilege with respect to a part of the Discovery, respond to the remainder of the Discovery and furnish all information over which you are not claiming the privilege.

D. Plaintiffs' requests for identification of professionals consulted in regard to asbestos contamination in Lincoln County are proper.

BNSF next objects to Interrogatories No. 8 and 9 and Requests for Production No. 3 and 13 on the basis that they impermissibly seek protected opinions of experts retained in anticipation of litigation. These requests seek 1) the identity of professional individuals or organizations whom BNSF has consulted with regarding asbestos contamination in Lincoln County (Int. No. 8); 2) the identity of professional individuals or organizations whom BNSF has consulted with regarding the propensity of BNSF's activities to entrain asbestos into the air in Lincoln County (Int. No. 9); 3) documents directly associated with that consultation (RFP No. 3); and 4) documents regarding studies of Libby Vermiculite in Montana conducted or funded by BNSF (RFP No. 13). <u>None of these requests reference, or are specifically directed at, consultations preformed in anticipation of litigation.</u>

Simply because Plaintiffs have used the word "consulted" in their requests does not result in blanket protection for all responsive documents under M. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B), nor does it support BNSF's motion to strike the requests in whole. Whether responsive information falls under the limited protections of Rule 26(b)(4)(B) requires a careful analysis of whether the individual or entity with which BNSF consulted is properly designated as an "expert" and whether they were "retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial." See, e.g., Sullivan v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 80 F.R.D. 489, 491 (D. Mont. 1978) (expert's knowledge and opinions were developed for litigation but not for the instant litigation and not for the use of the party retaining the expert, who was not in that party's employ at the time, meaning the current party cannot shield the expert from discovery on these matters); Bank Brussels Lambert v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 175 F.R.D. 34, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd (Aug. 15, 1997)("In determining whether an expert was hired in anticipation of litigation, the court must examine 'the total factual situation in the particular case."). Thus, such information will only be protected if there is ongoing or pending litigation and the consultation was performed specifically in relation thereto.

Rule 26(b)(4)(B) "does not address itself to the expert whose information was not acquired in preparation for trial but who was an actor or viewer with respect to the transactions or occurrences which are a part of the subject matter of a lawsuit, and such an expert should be treated as an ordinary witness." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, notes of Advisory Committee. Professional consultations can be performed for many reasons other than pursuant to litigation. For example, BNSF likely consulted with various professional entities in assessing and performing necessary vermiculite and asbestos removal activities on their Lincoln County properties, assessing safety precautions that would be necessary during such removal activities, or assessing potential asbestos exposure risks to its workers and the surrounding community. Moreover, there are large periods of time in which no litigation regarding Libby Vermiculite exposure was pending or ongoing, and any professional consultations regarding Libby Vermiculite performed during these periods would be discoverable.

Moreover, as BNSF points out, Plaintiffs <u>can</u> obtain "facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been specially retained by another party in anticipation of litigation [when] it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts and opinions on the same subject matter by other means." M. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B). Courts and commentators have commonly identified two situations in which this standard is met:

The first situation is where the object or condition observed by the nontestifying expert is no longer "observable by an expert of the party seeking discovery." *See id.;* David S. Day, *Expert Discovery in the Eighth Circuit,* 122 F.R.D. 35, 39 (1988). This situation has been demonstrated where some physical condition has deteriorated enough so that one party's expert may be the only expert who actually could have fairly observed it before its deterioration. *See, e.g., Delcastor, Inc.*

v. Vail Assoc., 108 F.R.D. 405 (D.Colo.1985) (holding that one party's expert who observed a site one day after a mud slide had knowledge unobtainable through any other source); Sanford Constr. Co. v. Kaiser Chemical Sales. Inc., 45 F.R.D. Aluminum & 465. 466 (E.D.Ky.1968) (holding that plaintiff's expert had knowledge unobtainable through any other source where plaintiff refused to allow defendant's experts access to site where ruptured sewer pipe was being removed); MacDonald Sprague Roofing Co. v. USM Weather-Shield Sys. Co., 38 Fed.R.Serv.2d 518 (D.Mass.1983) (compelling discovery of non-testifying expert's report where defendant was unable to test allegedly defective roof since roof had been replaced).

The second situation commonly recognized as constituting exceptional circumstances is where it is possible to replicate expert discovery on a contested issue, but the costs would be judicially prohibitive. *See In re Agent Orange*, 105 F.R.D. at 581 (compelling discovery of experts retained in a companion case which was part of the same multidistrict litigation because otherwise plaintiffs would have to devote enormous time and resources to duplicating the experts' efforts).

Bank Brussels Lambert v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 175 F.R.D. 34, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), <u>aff'd</u> (Aug. 15, 1997). Here, BNSF has removed substantial asbestos and vermiculite from, and made significant modifications to, its Lincoln County properties. Thus, any consultations BNSF engaged regarding asbestos contamination and associated airborne asbestos levels in Lincoln County would likely be discoverable even in the unlikely circumstance they were prepared in anticipation of litigation. Assessment of whether these exceptions would apply to a given consultation requires the disclosure of appropriate descriptive and identifying information.

Once again, if any responsive information involves professionals retained in anticipation of this or related litigation, the proper course is to disclose the requisite information in a privilege log without revealing the privileged facts or opinions. It would be improper to strike the entirety of Plaintiffs' requests as BNSF suggests.

E. Plaintiffs' requests are not duplicative of prior cases.

While it is true that certain of Plaintiffs' requests implicate some responsive materials that have been produced in prior litigation, Plaintiffs believe it is appropriate to have a complete production in the cases currently before the Court. In addition, where duplicative productions were requested or expected, Plaintiffs have <u>directed BNSF that "reference to bates number, description of the documents, and date of production will be sufficient and no repeat production is requested, as long as documents can be identified and located by Plaintiffs' counsel."² Plaintiffs' counsel does not intend to create extra work for any party and would stipulate to this procedure throughout the requests as to any duplicative production.</u>

BNSF's specific objection in this regard is to RFP No. 29, which requests certain historic documents regarding railroad knowledge of asbestos hazards, which were submitted or admitted in the case of *Kath v. Burlington Northern R. Co.*, 441 N.W.2d 569 (1989). BNSF contends that it has already produced these documents

² In this regard, please note that Plaintiffs' reference to Interrogatory No. 28 in RFP No. 4 is a drafting error and is meant to reference Interrogatory No. 27 (there is no Interrogatory No. 28).

to Plaintiffs' counsel in multiple other cases.³ BNSF's responses to similar requests in the past were in the form of objections and BNSF has yet to produce the requested materials. As an example, BNSF's most recent response to this request in the *Kampf v. BNSF* case, CDV-16-0424, was as follows:

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 34: Produce copies of the documents known as the "Alton Railroad documents" that were admitted and referenced as such by the Court of Appeals of Minnesota in the case of *Kath v. Burlington Northern R. Co.*, 441 N.W.2d 569 (1989) and/or any related proceedings, along with any associated or related documents including those used to establish foundation and/or authenticity of the "Alton Railroad documents."

RESPONSE: In addition to the General Objections, BNSF objects to this request as overly broad on the grounds it is not limited in scope as to "related proceedings, along with any associated or related documents." BNSF further objects on the grounds the request is vague and ambiguous as to what is meant by "Alton Railroad documents." BNSF also objects on the grounds the request is not tailored to the claims of the Plaintiff, or to a sufficiently narrow topic or claimed injury relevant to the issues in this case. BNSF further objects to the extent the requested documents were "admitted" in the cited case, and therefore are in the public domain, and equally available and accessible to Plaintiff. Furthermore, BNSF does not keep the "Alton Railroad Documents" as part of its corporate or business records. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections, BNSF does not keep any such documents as part of its corporate or business records. Finally, given the age of the documents, and the fact that BNSF does not maintain the documents as part of its corporate or business records, BNSF does not believe that the documents can be authenticated because a meaningful foundation cannot be laid.

³ BNSF inaccurately asserts these materials were also produced in the unrelated case of *Daley v*. *BNSF*, DV-05-882. Plaintiffs object to any reliance on the unrelated *Daley* case as it <u>did not</u> <u>involve exposure to Libby asbestos or vermiculite</u> but instead involved occupational exposure to various substances of a tie plant worker in Somers, Montana.

Because BNSF has yet to produce these materials, Plaintiff has again requested their production.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs' requests are not unnecessarily cumulative, are reasonably limited in time and scope, and do not improperly seek discovery of information that is privileged. Plaintiffs' requests have been narrowly tailored to obtain relevant responsive information and materials. In addition, Plaintiffs have attempted to resolve BNSF's objections as reasonably as possible. For the reasons stated herein, the Court should overrule BNSF's general objections and deny BNSF's motion to strike Plaintiffs' requests in their entirety.

Respectfully submitted this 9th day of March, 2018.

McGARVEY, HEBERLING, SULLIVAN & LACEY, P.C.

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